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Introduction
Mountain ecosystems are the water towers of the world and
sustainable management is critical to the provision, not only
of clean water, but also of food security and energy to
downstream communities. Although this is widely
acknowledged, communities and countries located in
mountain ecosystems are rarely compensated for their land
stewardship. Even more exceptional is the initiation and
financing of payments for environmental services (PES) by
the private sector. Nestle Waters, the owner of Vittel and the
world leader in the mineral water bottling business, is one
notable exception. 
The problem
Vittel mineral water comes from two large aquifers located
at the foot of the Vosges mountain range in Northeastern
France. Land in the watershed is used for dairy production,
and the introduction of intensive cattle ranching in the latter
part of the last century demanded input-intensive corn
cultivation for animal feed. The high levels of nitrate
fertiliser applied, overstocking and poor management of
animal waste led to an increasing risk of nitrate
contamination beyond levels acceptable under the Vittel
label. French legislation on mineral spring water is also
extremely strict: water quality must be stabilised naturally
with no water treatment. If standards are not met, the
business must close down.  
Nestle Waters was therefore faced with five alternatives: 
1. Doing nothing.
2. Relocating to a new catchment where risks were lower.
3. Purchasing all lands in the spring catchment.
4. Requiring farmers to change their practices through legal
action.
Spa Board at Town Entrance. Photo: Danièle Perrot-Maître.
5. Providing incentives to farmers to voluntarily change their
practices.
Doing nothing was too costly, and the risk of having to close
the business too high for a brand that sells one billion bottles
every year. Meanwhile relocating to a new catchment would
have meant losing the Vittel label and the premium price
that goes with it. Owing to legislative restrictions on buying
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes on top of the
risks of social unrest, it was not feasible to purchase all the
lands in the catchment. The legitimacy of using legal action
was questionable since it was impossible to link nitrate levels
to the activities of individual farmers, and nitrate levels were
still low enough that legal action would not appear justified.
The only viable option, therefore, was to implement a PES
scheme. The principle challenge in this strategy was how to
make the interests of farmers coincide with those of Vittel.  
Designing PES
Before launching the scheme, a four year research
programme was undertaken by a Vittel subsidiary company in
partnership with the French National Agronomic Institute
(INRA) to assess possible incentive mechanisms and linkages
between agricultural practice and water quality. A number
of requirements were identified to maintain reduced rates
of nitrate contamination and a zero pesticides level:
• Giving up maize cultivation for animal feed (land under
maize production shows nitrate rates of up to 200mg/l in
the root zone).
• Adopting extensive cattle ranching including pasture
management (hay and alfalfa rotation so that farms
produce all animal feeds themselves).
• Reducing carrying capacity to a maximum of one cattle
head per hectare.
• Composting animal waste with optimal application in the
fields.
• Giving up agrochemicals (chemical fertiliser replaced with
composted manure, no pesticides).
• Balancing animal rations to reach optimal milk
productivity and farm profitability.
• Modernising farm buildings for optimal waste
management and storing.
At first there was substantial resistance from the farming
community. Indeed, it took Vittel ten years to transform
conflict into a successful partnership. However, Vittel took a
proactive approach, investing US $24.5 million over a seven
year period to support the transition from intensive to
extensive farming practices. A pivotal event also occurred in
1992 when Nestlé Waters created Agrivair, an intermediary
responsible for negotiating and implementing the
programme. Agrivair was strategically located just outside
the town of Vittel, close to farmers and farmers’
associations, while the Director was well known to farmers
and stakeholders in the area.
Reaching consensus 
A major point of contention was how to value the services
provided by farmers, and whether to base payments on the
opportunity costs of farmers or those of the company. On the
one hand, farmers were in a strong bargaining position with
the combined ability to radically affect water quality, and
on the other, Vittel’s strong brand connections to the ‘Grande
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Source’ (Great Spring) area compelled the company to
pursue a mutually beneficial solution. However, given that
Vittel is a major employer in the region, many farmers came
to recognise that protection of the ‘Grande Source’ would in
fact be of mutual benefit. 
Before joining the scheme, targeted farmers were all heavily
in debt (and in many cases no longer owned their land) as a
result of purchasing equipment for intensive farming
promoted by the European Union Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Land debt is very prevalent in this part of France,
where it is estimated that about 87% of the land is purchased
through bank loans. Under the final agreement, ownership
of the land was taken away from creditors and farmers were
provided with long-term use rights. 
Vittel entered into long-term contracts with 26 out of 37
farmers in the watershed who were committed to continuing
farming in the area. These contracts provided farmers with
subsidies and land use rights for up to 30 years on larger plot
sizes (average 150 ha) in return for adhering to specified
management practices. The farms not included in the
scheme were marginal, mainly owned by families close to
retirement with unlikely succession. 
The incentive package
1. Long term security through 18 or 30 year contracts.
2. Abolition of debt linked to land acquisition, and land
acquired by Vittel left in usufruct for up to 30 years.
3. Subsidy of, on average, about 200 euros/ha/year over
five years.1
4. Up to 150,000 euros per farm to cover the cost of all
new farm equipment and building modernisation.
5. Free labour to apply compost in farmers’ fields. This is
to address the labour bottleneck and ensure optimal
amounts are applied on each plot. These amounts are
calculated for each plot for each farm every year, and
individual farm plans are also developed on an annual
basis.
6. Free technical assistance including individual farm
plans and introduction to new social and professional
networks. This is particularly important as giving up
the intensive agricultural system alienated farmers
from traditional farming networks and support
organisations.
Impact
The programme was ultimately successful. By 2004, 1700 ha
of maize had been eliminated, and 92% of the sub-basin was
protected. The programme speeded up the retirement of the
marginal farmers who sold their land to Agrivair. The number
of farms in the sub-basin declined from 37 to 26, while the
additional land requirements of extensive production meant
that average farm size increased to 150 ha. A clear indicator
of success has been the request from young farmers who
have taken over family farms to enter into 30 year contracts. 
Payments are based on compliance rather than service
provision, since it is impossible to link changes in water
quality to practices on individual farms. Optimal rates of
manure application are established for each farm plot every
year and manure applied by directly by Agrivair labourers.
However, there is extensive monitoring of nitrate levels in
the water as well as farming practices. Farmers’ compliance
with the new extensive farming system is not an issue, since
once they have implemented the switch there is no incentive
at all to revert to former practices. 
Ideally, a “perfect PES” would be able to establish a precise
link between farmers’ practices and nitrate and pesticide
rates in the aquifer – although, given the complexity of
hydrogeological relationships, it is doubtful if any programme
could ever be expected to do this.
Conclusions and recommendations
The Vittel experience demonstrates that there is a strong
business case for private sector participation in water-related
PES. It is most likely to be replicable in places where water
cannot be treated, land cannot be purchased and set aside for
conservation, where the risk to business is high, the link between
ecosystem health and farming practices is well understood and
where expected benefits are sufficiently high to justify the
investment. Although this set of conditions is more likely to be
found in industrialised countries (Nestlé Waters has used a
similar approach with the sources in Perrier and Contrexeville in
France), it could be applicable in a developing country context
provided there is good enforceable contract law.
Over time in Vittel (and similarly in the Catskills Watershed in
New York City), PES needed to be complemented with other
approaches and periodically evaluated to address urban-based
non-point source pollution. Before establishing a PES scheme,
it is also critical to examine whether there are alternatives and
more cost-effective and politically acceptable solutions, such
as removing perverse incentives. In Vittel and in Europe,
agricultural intensification (and the ecosystem degradation
that came with it) was heavily promoted and subsidised by the
CAP as agricultural and environmental policies were decoupled.
Fortunately this is changing.
In contrast with annual payments made under the CAP, the
payments made by Vittel reflect a commitment to the long-
term viability of farming. The scheme was made possible by
a special set of conditions that may or may not be found
elsewhere. However, what is replicable, even outside of
Europe, is the process through which the scheme was
developed, which gave special attention to context rather
than seeking out ideal conditions, and which transformed a
situation of conflict into a successful partnership.
Vittel landscape. Photo: Danièle Perrot-Maître.
1 INRA estimated that during the first five years, farmer subsidies were equivalent of up to 75 percent of farm diposable income (INRA 1997). This is to ensure a guaranteed income
during the transition period and reimburse the debt contracted before entering the programme for the acqusition of farm equipment. The exact amount is negotiated for each farm.
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The ability to maintain farmers’ income levels at all times
and finance all technological changes was important, but the
primary reasons for the programme’s success were not
financial. Changing farming practices is as much a social and
political change as a technical one. Efforts were made from
the very beginning to understand farmer’s livelihood
strategies, perspectives and constraints, which allowed the
company to create dialogue and partnership based on trust
and mutual interest. The creation of an intermediary
institution, the development of a long-term participatory
process to identify alternative practices and a mutually
acceptable set of incentives, the ability to link incentives to
land tenure and debt cycle issues and to build new support
networks were all fundamental conditions for the
programme’s success. 
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